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“[I]n the application of a Constitution, our contemplation cannot
be only of what has been, but of what may be.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
A. THE FACTS
IN May of 2016, controversy arose out of Los Angeles, California, af-ter federal authorities obtained a search warrant “allowing the gov-ernment to force people present when the warrant [was] executed to
press their fingers and thumbs on the fingerprint sensors of any phones or
computers found there to unlock them.”2 Although the warrant itself was
not made public,3 a memorandum4 filed with the United States District
Court for the Central District of California in support of the warrant ap-
plication reveals the scope of the search these California authorities
sought to carry out and their explanation as to why the warrant was
constitutional.
1. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
2. Orin Kerr, Can Warrants for Digital Evidence Also Require Fingerprints to Unlock
Phones?, WASH. POST (Oct. 19, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-con
spiracy/wp/2016/10/19/can-warrants-for-digital-evidence-also-require-fingerprints-to-unloc
k-phones/?utm_term=.46b538fa904f [https://perma.cc/DEZ3-23WE].
3. Thomas Fox-Brewster, Feds Walk into a Building, Demand Everyone’s Finger-
prints to Open Phones, FORBES (Oct. 16, 2016), http://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrew
ster/2016/10/16/doj-demands-mass-fingerprint-seizure-to-open-iphones/#2e3eec98d9d2 [ht
tps://perma.cc/5TMQ-WADB].
4. Notice of Filing Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Search War-
rant Application, Filed by United States Attorney for the Central District of California and
Assistant United States Attorney (May 9, 2016), https://www.documentcloud.org/docu
ments/3143273-Mass-Fingerprint-Case-Redacted-Copy-1.html [https://perma.cc/9SP8-EL
2K] [hereinafter Memorandum].
2017] When Fingerprints Are Key 535
In the memorandum, U.S. attorneys detailed that they sought the
warrant:
to use the fingerprints and thumbprints of any person who is lo-
cated at the SUBJECT PREMISES during the execution of the
search and who is reasonably believed by law enforcement to be a
user of a fingerprint sensor-enabled device that is located at the
SUBJECT PREMISES and falls within the scope of the warrant.5
The federal government’s memorandum further requested authority to
seize “passwords, encryption keys, and other access devices” to maintain
access to the devices.6 The memorandum stated that without the numeri-
cal or alpha-numerical passcodes to access the cellphones located within
the subject premises, the government otherwise would not be able to ob-
tain the contents of the devices if not authorized to use fingerprints and
thumbprints to unlock them.7
The U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Central District of California ad-
vanced various legal arguments in support of its search warrant. Specifi-
cally, the federal government argued that such a warrant would not
violate the Fourth or Fifth Amendments of the Constitution.8 For the
sake of brevity and clarity, this Comment’s focus will be solely on the
government’s Fifth Amendment conclusion.9 Specifically, the Comment
will focus on whether it is a violation of the Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination for the government to compel individuals to
press their fingerprint on their smartphone to unlock it and make its con-
tents accessible.
1. The Government’s Fifth Amendment Argument
The U.S. attorneys argued that “[c]ompelling a person to provide his or
her fingerprint does not implicate, let alone violate, the Fifth Amend-
ment.”10 Referencing the Supreme Court case of Schmerber v. California,
the federal government stated that the Fifth Amendment does not pro-
tect individuals from compulsory fingerprinting because the Fifth
Amendment does not concern itself with fingerprinting, but rather with
protecting accused individuals from producing “testimonial or communi-
cative evidence” against themselves.11 Moreover, the government’s mem-
orandum stated that Schmerber clarifies that the prohibition of accused
individuals providing testimonial or communicative evidence against
themselves “[did] not apply to the use of a person’s ‘body as evidence
5. Id. at 1–2 (emphasis added).
6. Id. at 4 (quoting the warrant).
7. Id. at 3.
8. Id.
9. See id. at 5–7. Unlike the Fifth Amendment issue—or non-issue according to the
federal government—the government acknowledged the existence of Fourth Amendment
concerns but nonetheless maintained that the search warrant did not violate the Fourth
Amendment. Id. at 5.
10. Memorandum, supra note 4, at 3.
11. Id. (quoting 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966)).
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when it may be material.’”12 Thus, federal authorities in this case inter-
preted Fifth Amendment precedent to mean that government compulsion
of “identifiable physical characteristics” does not violate the right against
self-incrimination provided in the Constitution.13
Furthermore, the government cited Ninth Circuit precedent to argue
that “fingerprint evidence from a defendant or a suspect are not prohib-
ited by the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination because
such evidence is not testimonial in nature.”14 While federal authorities
conceded that “the government does not know ahead of time the identity
of every digital device or fingerprint . . . that it will find in the search,” it
asserted that it “demonstrated probable cause that evidence may exist at
the search location” and, therefore, required “access to those devices”
and the ability to “maintain that access to search them.”15 Therefore, the
U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Central District of California contended
that because a fingerprint is an identifiable physical characteristic and not
testimonial or communicative evidence, then the privilege against self-
incrimination did not apply in this situation.16
2. Criticism of Such Practices
The search warrant in this case raises potential constitutional issues on
Fifth Amendment grounds, particularly with respect to the right against
self-incrimination.17 Experts have warned of the lack of legal protections
that exist in the area of fingerprint technology to prevent infringement of
basic constitutional rights.18 Despite federal authorities in this case assert-
ing that their actions did not violate the Fifth Amendment guarantee
against self-incrimination, others have voiced their “shock” at the situa-
tion and view it as an “unprecedented attempt to bypass the security of
. . . smartphone[s] that use[ ] fingerprints to unlock.”19 Others question
whether authorities are simply seeking such warrants to get more infor-
mation after executing the warrants, rather than basing their warrant re-
quests on already existing facts that raise reasonable suspicion.20
These attempts have been denounced as “inventive” ways for law en-
forcement officials to try to legally penetrate through the security of
12. Id. (quoting Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 763).
13. Id. (quoting United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1973)).
14. Id. at 4 (quoting Commonwealth of N. Marian Islands v. Bowie, 243 F. 3d 1109,
1120 n.5 (9th Cir. 2001); citing Virginia v. Baust, 89 Va. Cir. 267 (Oct. 28, 2014) (“holding
that defendant could be compelled to provide his fingerprint in order to unlock phone”)).
15. Memorandum, supra note 4, at 4.
16. See id. at 3–4.
17. See Kerr, supra note 2.
18. Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai, Cops Can Make You Unlock Your Smartphone
with Fingerprint, Says Judge, MASHABLE (Oct. 30, 2014), http://mashable.com/2014/10/30/
cops-can-force-you-to-unlock-phone-with-fingerprint-ruling/ [https://perma.cc/39NN-
LJGX].
19. Fox-Brewster, supra note 3.
20. Id.
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smartphones, as new legal and technical barriers hinder their efforts.21
Criminal defense attorney Marina Medvin stated that the government is
“seeking to have the ability to convince people to comply by providing
their fingerprints to law enforcement under the color of law – because of
the fact that they already have a warrant.”22 Andrew Crocker, a staff at-
torney at the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), opined that using
warrants to compel the production of fingerprints, rather than potentially
self-incriminating passwords, to unlock phones was a “‘clever end-run’
around constitutional rights.”23
Crocker also seriously questioned the wide-reaching scope of these
warrants.24 He questioned whether the Fourth Amendment, which pro-
tects against unreasonable search and seizure, “allows such an open-en-
ded extension of the search warrant.”25 Crocker noted that despite search
warrants needing to be “narrow and clear in scope,” the warrant in this
case unnecessarily extended to every phone in the property and all of the
private information contained in them.26 Another EFF attorney, Jennifer
Lynch, also scrutinized the specificity and particularity of these war-
rants.27 Lynch argued that “[t]he government needs to say specifically
what information they expect to find on the phone, how that [informa-
tion] relates to criminal activity and . . . to access only the information
that is relevant to the investigation.”28 Lynch added that the warrant’s
scope must be limited and describe the place and people to be searched
with particularity.29
B. OVERVIEW OF COMMENT
The implications of the government’s request and the growing preva-
lence of fingerprint and other biometric data implemented in personal
devices30 warrant a discussion on the constitutionality of such practices as
they relate to the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
Such a discussion is not only timely, but also urgent, if our legal system is
to develop in unison with technological and societal developments. Nov-
elty is also a factor that calls for this discussion because, as it has been
21. Id. Technical difficulties law enforcement officials encounter involve, for example,
the disabling of fingerprint authentication in iPhones (TouchID) after 48 hours of not using
the feature or rebooting the cellphone. See About Touch ID Security on iPhone and iPad,
APPLE: SUPPORT (Nov. 3, 2015), https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204587 [https://perma
.cc/M99M-6BB9] [hereinafter Touch ID].
22. Fox-Brewster, supra note 3.
23. Karen Turner, Feds Use Search Warrants to Get into Fingerprint-Locked Phones,






27. Fox-Brewster, supra note 3.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See discussion infra Part II.
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correctly pointed out, “[t]his scenario presents the courts with an issue of
first impression, because in the past, a fingerprint was merely used as a
method of identification”31 and not as a key that grants access to a per-
son’s most sensitive information.
Critically, the discussion should focus on the principles underwriting
the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. When new devel-
opments—whether technological, social, or political in nature—signifi-
cantly challenge the perceptions and notions Americans have of their
basic Constitutional rights, it becomes imperative to take a principled
look at these constitutionally-protected guarantees to ensure that these
new developments are adapted to conform to the Constitutional frame-
work, rather than vice-versa. To do otherwise would be to compromise
the foundations of our legal system, and by consequence, our legal rights,
to the caprices of the world’s happenings.
Even though constitutional analysis of cell phone searches has mostly
focused around the Fourth Amendment, “the Fifth Amendment is emerg-
ing in importance as access to . . . cellular phone[s] advances.”32 Using
current precedent and taking into account the principle of “privacy” that
serves as a justification for the privilege against self-incrimination, this
Comment will examine the Fifth Amendment theories set forth by fed-
eral authorities in the Los Angeles case33 and other arguments that have
been advanced to endorse this type of activity. For purposes of this Com-
ment, it will be assumed that, like the executed warrant described in the
introduction, the government compels undescribed individuals inside of
subject premises to unlock their cell phones using their fingerprints and
finds incriminating information inside of those devices. Therefore, the is-
sue this Comment seeks to elucidate is whether incriminating evidence
obtained by an individual’s act of unlocking his phone using his finger-
print under government compulsion violates that individual’s right
against self-incrimination. Finding an appropriate answer to this question
turns on whether the act of pressing a fingerprint onto a phone to unlock
it and make its contents accessible qualifies as “testimonial” activity.34
Part II of this Comment will provide information on the ubiquitous
character of smartphone and other digital technologies.35 Part II will also
detail how smartphone devices increasingly contain more private infor-
mation of individuals.36 Thereafter, Part II will discuss how fingerprint
and other biometric data features have been integrated as encryption
mechanisms into these devices to strengthen their security.37 A discussion
will also be provided on how federal and other law enforcement authori-
31. Kara Goldman, Note, Biometric Passwords and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimi-
nation, 33 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 211, 215 (2015).
32. Kristen Vogl, Isearch into the Iphone, 20 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 179, 180 (2015).
33. See Fox-Brewster, supra note 3; Kerr, supra note 2.
34. See generally Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910).
35. See infra Section II.A.
36. See infra Section II.A.
37. See infra Section II.B.
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ties use data in mobile devices in their investigations.38
Part III will analyze whether compelling individuals to depress their
fingerprints on smartphone devices to unlock them amounts to a viola-
tion of the constitutional right against self-incrimination.39 To place the
analysis in context, Part III will give an overview of Supreme Court pre-
cedent regarding the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination,40
and it will address how lower courts have used this precedent in cases
involving both encryption in technological devices and the privilege
against self-incrimination.41 Part III will also discuss the foregone conclu-
sion doctrine.42
Part IV of this Comment will analyze whether these cases, and more
importantly, warrants issued to access smartphones using fingerprints, im-
plicate the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.43 Although
it previously has been suggested that government compulsion to unlock a
cell phone using fingerprints “falls well within the scope of rights afforded
by the Fifth Amendment,”44 this Comment suggests that it does not
under the current state of the law. However, courts should devise new
standards for these situations based on principles of privacy that under-
gird the right against self-incrimination. Therefore, this Comment ad-
vances the proposition that, even though the warrant issued in the
California case is not unconstitutional under current jurisprudence con-
cerning the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, courts
should devise a new standard based on the principle of privacy to address
these situations.
II. BACKGROUND ON MOBILE DEVICES, BIOMETRIC
INFORMATION, AND THEIR ROLE IN
CRIMINAL INVESTGATIONS
A. THE UBIQUITY OF MOBILE DEVICES AND GROWTH OF
FINGERPRINT AUTHENTICATION
One of the safest assumptions a person could make in today’s America
is that any random individual walking down the street is likely carrying a
smartphone. Smartphones have become virtually synonymous with neces-
sity and may be reasonably characterized as “extensions of ourselves.”45
Commenting on the ubiquity of these devices, Chief Justice Roberts has
previously remarked that smartphones “are now such a pervasive and in-
38. See infra Section II.C.
39. See generally infra Part III.
40. See infra Section III.A.
41. See infra Section III.C.
42. See infra Section III.B.
43. See generally infra Part IV.
44. Goldman, supra note 31, at 228.
45. See Michael Lynch, Leave My iPhone Alone: Why Our Smartphones Are Exten-
sions of Ourselves, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 19, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/technol
ogy/2016/feb/19/iphone-apple-privacy-smartphones-extension-of-ourselves [https://perma
.cc/W8YW-KK59].
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sistent part of daily life that the proverbial visitor from Mars might con-
clude they were an important feature of human anatomy.”46
According to the Pew Research Center, 95% of Americans own a cell
phone of some kind, while 77% own cell phones considered to be
“smartphone” devices.47 A 2015 study conducted by the professional ser-
vices firm Deloitte “found that Americans collectively check their
smartphones upwards of 8 billion times per day,” meaning that across age
groups, the average American checks his or her phone forty-six times in
one day.48
Americans not only use their cell phones regularly, but the activities
they use them for are often private in nature. The Pew Research Center
found that 67% of Americans use their cell phones to share intimate in-
formation about their personal lives like “pictures, videos, or commen-
tary about events happening in their community, with 35% doing so
frequently.”49 Furthermore, a study from 2012 revealed that a majority of
Americans not only use their cell phones to share these intimate details
of their personal lives, but also that roughly half of America’s cell phone
users create back-up files of this data on their phones,50 signaling how
much value they place on this information.
Other data gathered by the Pew Research Center showed that most
Americans use their smartphones for very private reasons such as looking
up specifics on their health conditions and engaging in online banking,
while a substantial portion of the smartphone-using population use their
devices for other personal reasons like job searching or submitting job
applications.51 In fact, as of early 2013, 78% of mobile technology users
believed the information contained in their mobile devices to be as pri-
vate as that stored in traditional computers.52 As the Supreme Court has
astutely recognized, to call modern mobile devices merely cell phones is
“misleading” because “[t]hey could just as easily be called cameras, video
players, rolodexes, calendars, tape recorders, libraries, diaries, albums,
46. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014).
47. Mobile Fact Sheet, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Jan 12, 2017), http://www.pewinternet
.org/fact-sheet/mobile/ [https://perma.cc/FUH8-F434].
48. Lisa Eadicicco, Americans Check Their Phones 8 Billion Times a Day, TIME (Dec.
15, 2015), http://time.com/4147614/smartphone-usage-us-2015/ [https://perma.cc/M6TF-
UZ89].
49. Aaron Smith, U.S. Smartphone Use in 2015, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Apr. 1, 2015),
http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/04/01/us-smartphone-use-in-2015/ [https://perma.cc/S64H-
Z9WD].
50. Jan L. Boyles, Aaron Smith, & Mary Madden, Main Findings: Apps and Privacy:
More Than Half of App Users Have Uninstalled or Decided to Not Install an App Due to
Concerns About Their Personal Information, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Sep. 15, 2012), http://
www.pewinternet.org/2012/09/05/main-findings-7/ [https://perma.cc/6CTK-W87W].
51. See Smith, supra note 49.
52. John B. Kennedy & Annie C. Bai, Reining in Mobile App Privacy Practices, LAW
360 (JAN. 25, 2017, 12:23 PM), HTTP://WWW.LAW360.COM/ARTICLES/407974/REINING-IN-MO-
BILE-APP-PRIVACY-PRACTICES [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/CSH6-U8FL] (CITING JENNIFER M. UR-
BAN, CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE & SU LI, Mobile Phones and Privacy (U.C. Berkeley Public
Law Research Paper No. 2103405, 2012), https://iapp.org/media/pdf/knowledge_center/
Mobile_phones_and_privacy.pdf [https://perma.cc/DS8V-H9YB]).
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televisions, maps, or newspapers.”53
Moreover, Americans are not oblivious to the inherent privacy dangers
smartphone devices possess. Significantly, “54% of app users have de-
cided to not install a cell phone app once they discovered how much per-
sonal information they would need to share in order to use it.”54 Given
the swelling dependency on mobile devices for everyday use,55 it is rea-
sonable to conclude that all of these data figures have meaningfully in-
creased since these studies were conducted.
Thus, it is evident that Americans widely use smartphone devices and
that they associate a high level of privacy with them. People use
smartphones for a variety of personal reasons, including communicating
with family and friends, online banking, and storing photos.56 The private
nature of the activities performed on mobile devices makes encryption of
these devices not only convenient, but necessary. Thus, many technology
companies have developed devices that may be easily encrypted and
often make encryption mechanisms default features on their devices.57
B. FINGERPRINT SENSORS AS UNLOCKING MECHANISMS
IN CELLPHONES
The ubiquity of these new technologies and the personal and intimate
activities they are used for invariably raise concerns over how individual
privacy may be affected.58 At the center of these concerns is whether and
how both industry and the legal system will ensure that our fundamental
rights are not infringed in this new era of digital privacy. On a technical
level, technology companies have responded to these privacy concerns by
implementing encryption into their devices.59
Fundamentally, encryption is a method that makes data inaccessible by
converting understandable information into an incomprehensible amal-
gam of numbers and letters.60 The purpose of encryption is to safeguard
information and “make[ ] it undecipherable to third parties” by using a
password, or any other method of verification or authentication, to block
access to that information.61 Cryptography, the study of encryption, ex-
amines “how parties safeguard important information on personal de-
53. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489 (2014).
54. Jan L. Boyles, Aaron Smith, & Mary Madden, supra note 50.
55. See Smith, supra note 49.
56. See id.
57. See iOS Security: iOS 10, APPLE (Mar. 2017), https://www.apple.com/business/docs/
iOS_Security_Guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/3KMP-PPXU] (“By setting up a device pass-
code, the user automatically enables Data Protection.”).
58. See Matthew Whitten, Attacking Analogies: The Need for Independent Standards
for Mobile Privacy, 19 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1, 1 (2015).
59. See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
60. See A Brief History of Cryptography, CYPHER RES. LABORATORIES, http://www
.cypher.com.au/crypto_history.htm [https://perma.cc/Z25L-AFJ3] (last visited Jan. 6, 2017).
61. Michael Wachtel, Give Me Your Password Because Congress Can Say So: An
Analysis of Fifth Amendment Protection Afforded Individuals Regarding Compelled Pro-
duction of Encrypted Data and Possible Solutions to the Problem of Getting Data from
Someone’s Mind, 14 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 44, 47 (2013).
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vices, such as computers, by using passwords as a form of encryption.”62
Whenever anyone—”including the government acting in [its] . . . investi-
gatory capacity”—attempts to decrypt an encrypted device, they seek to
access the “plaintext,” or the underlying data that is protected through
encryption.63
An “encryption key” is required to fully decrypt an encrypted device.64
Encryption keys are a series of number sequences “stored in the encryp-
tion software’s memory” that are lengthy and complex.65 Passwords and
other verification and authentication tools, when entered into a device,
trigger the encryption key and grant access to the data contained in the
device.66 Thus, “[w]hen the government ‘seeks to compel [individuals]
to’” decrypt their devices, they look for production of the verification or
authentication tool (be it a password or, for our purposes, a fingerprint)
used to trigger the encryption key, “rather than the intricate encryption
key” itself.67
The advent of encryption has revolutionized how we perceive our mo-
bile devices. Nowadays, smartphone devices “are in many respects akin
to a safe” because people often use them to protect information that they
wish to keep private, which they readily can accomplish with encryp-
tion.68 One form of encryption uses biometric data instead of numerical
or alphabetical passwords as an authentication source to protect informa-
tion.69 Fingerprint authentication, or the matching of a unique fingerprint
to a device to unlock it, is an example of such biometric encryption used
to protect sensitive information in electronic devices.70 “Apple Inc., Mo-
torola, HTC, and Samsung”—among other prominent cellphone manu-
facturers—have equipped their newest devices with fingerprint sensors
that may serve as “unlocking” devices.71 Using these sensors, users may
set up a security feature on their phones which allows them to unlock
their phones by simply pressing their unique finger or thumbprints on the
sensor.72 If the finger or thumbprint pressed onto the sensor matches the
one that was used to initially set up this feature, the phone will unlock.73
The integration of biometric data as a source of authentication to secure
devices reduces the mental taxation of users by avoiding the necessity of
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 48.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Wachtel, supra note 61, at 48 (quoting Brendan M. Palfreyman, Lessons from the
British and American Approaches to Compelled Decryption, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 345, 350-
51 (2009)).
68. Id. at 46.
69. Colin Soutar et al., Biometric Encryption, in ICSA GUIDE TO CRYPTOGRAPHY 1–2
(Randall K. Nichols ed., 1999), http://www.cse.lehigh.edu/prr/Biometrics/Archive/Papers/
BiometricEncryption.pdf [https://perma.cc/EMH7-UY8X].
70. See id. at 4–5.
71. Memorandum, supra note 4, at 1.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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memorizing number or letter sequences.74
In 2013, when Apple Inc. released its highly-anticipated iPhone 5s, “the
most forward-thinking smartphone in the world,” one of the phone’s
most appealing features was its implementation of the Touch ID finger
sensor.75 Apple described the Touch ID feature as “an innovative way to
simply and securely unlock your iPhone with just the touch of a finger.”76
Praising this innovative biometric feature, Apple says of their Touch ID
feature: “Your fingerprint is one of the best passcodes in the world. It’s
always with you, and no two are exactly alike.”77
The integration of these biometric features in smartphones reflects an
overarching trend in the growth of fingerprint recognition and other bio-
metric data used in mobile technologies. According to the research group
Research and Markets, the total market value of the “fingerprint recogni-
tion and mobile biometrics market” is projected to grow at an annual rate
of 215.49% between the years 2014 and 2019.78 Biometric authentication
is not only on a course of proliferation, but it is also headed in complex
directions as smartphone manufacturers look beyond fingerprint readers
and into retina scanners to strengthen the security of their devices.79
The trend toward biometric authentication meaningfully departs from
prior methods used to secure mobile devices such as numerical pass-
words. Although these technological features in smartphones are becom-
ing pervasive, concerns about the desirability of these features have
nonetheless been raised. This is especially true with regard to hacking; the
creation of backdoors to send stored fingerprint information to govern-
ments or third parties; and, importantly, the possible loophole it creates
for law enforcement officials to bypass certain constitutional rights of the
accused.80 It is incumbent upon the legal system to systemically address
74. Marco Tabini, Open Sesame: How iOS 8 Will Unlock Touch ID’s Power,
MACWORLD (July 22, 2014, 5:00 AM), http://www.macworld.com/article/2455474/open-ses
ame-how-ios-8-will-unlock-touch-ids-power.html [https://perma.cc/V2PF-5KQS].
75. Apple Announces iPhone 5s—The Most Forward-Thinking Smartphone in the
World, APPLE: PRESS RELEASES (Sept. 10, 2013), http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2013/09/
10Apple-Announces-iPhone-5s-The-Most-Forward-Thinking-Smartphone-in-the-World.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/KY3G-QQN6].
76. Id. (“Touch ID uses a laser cut sapphire crystal, together with the capacitive touch
sensor, to take a high-resolution image of your fingerprint . . . All fingerprint information is
encrypted and stored securely in the Secure Enclave inside the A7 chip on the iPhone 5s;
it’s never stored on Apple servers or backed up to iCloud®.”).
77. Touch ID, supra note 21.
78. Global Fingerprint Mobile Biometrics Market - Research Report 2015-2019, RE-
SEARCH AND MARKETS (Oct. 2015), http://www.researchandmarkets.com/research/rxxnls/
global [https://perma.cc/4NJ6-CP8G].
79. Lance Whitney, Galaxy S7 May Sport Retina Scanner with Pressure Sensitive Dis-
play, CNET (Dec. 14, 2015, 7:28 AM), http://www.cnet.com/news/samsung-galaxy-s7-might
-sport-pressure-sensitive-display/ [https://perma.cc/GT3G-CWMF].
80. See Rafe Needleman, The 2 Big Problems with Fingerprint Security, YAHOO TECH
(Jan. 28, 2015), https://www.yahoo.com/tech/the-2-big-problems-with-fingerprint-security-
109371608679.html [https://perma.cc/KQK7-JGTQ]; Joseph Steinberg, Why You Should
Not Use the New Smartphone Fingerprint Readers, FORBES (Mar. 5, 2015), http://www
.forbes.com/sites/josephsteinberg/2015/03/05/why-you-should-not-use-the-new-smartphone
-fingerprint-readers/#22d002521aa8 (Perma link unavailable); Alastair Stevenson, Hackers
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the legal challenges such a technological shift brings with respect to how
the government can access the information contained in the smartphone
devices of its citizens.
C. THE GROWING IMPORTANCE OF CELLPHONE DATA IN LAW
ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY
Considering the wealth of personal information stored in mobile de-
vices, the government naturally seeks warrants granting them permission
to access the devices of individuals they suspect of committing, or being
involved in, crimes. For instance, “[i]n 2012, federal and local law en-
forcement agencies made more than 1.1 million requests for the personal
cellphone data of Americans for a variety of investigative reasons.”81
However, because most smartphone devices are encrypted, law enforce-
ment’s only way of making the information in mobile devices accessible
and readable is by having the user of the device provide his passcode or
other form of authentication.82 Consumer control over encryption poses
an issue for law enforcement because it leaves the person being investi-
gated as the only party capable of decrypting his or her device and mak-
ing the information readily available.83 Because of this, law enforcement
officials have advocated for less secure encryption methods to facilitate
their activities.84
Amidst this growing governmental interest in accessing the information
stored in its citizens’ mobile devices, it is important to be aware of the
methods they employ to accomplish this and, more importantly, to con-
sider whether those methods respect basic constitutional rights. As previ-
ously explained, this Comment will analyze if an individual’s Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination is violated when the govern-
ment compels him to press his fingerprints on his phone to unlock it and
make its contents accessible. Although under current Supreme Court ju-
risprudence lower courts are likely to hold that this is not a violation of
Can Remotely Steal Your Identity Using Android Fingerprint Scanners, BUSINESS INSIDER
(Aug. 7, 2015, 7:23 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/android-phones-fingerprint-scan
ners-have-serious-security-vulnerabilities-2015-8 [https://perma.cc/3KQD-J8YG].
81. Tom Jackman, Experts Say Law Enforcement’s Use of Cellphone Records Can Be
Inaccurate, WASH. POST (June 27, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/experts-say
-law-enforcements-use-of-cellphone-records-can-be-inaccurate/2014/06/27/028be93c-faf3-
11e3-932c-0a55b81f48ce_story.html?utm_term=.dac740becb0a [https://perma.cc/MBA7-
EX39] (data compiled from a privacy-related survey undertaken by Sen. Edward J. Mar-
key of Massachusetts).
82. Matthew J. Weber, Note, Warning—Weak Password: The Courts’ Indecipherable
Approach to Encryption and the Fifth Amendment, 2016 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 455,
460 (2016).
83. Id. at 456 (citing Legal Process Guidelines: U.S. Law Enforcement, APPLE (Sept.
29, 2015), http://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/law-enforcement-guidelines-us.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7H7J-GF3T]).
84. MANHATTAN DIST. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, REPORT OF THE MANHATTAN DISTRICT
ATTORNEY’S OFFICE ON SMARTPHONE ENCRYPTION AND PUBLIC SAFETY 13 (Nov. 2015),
https://cyber.harvard.edu/pubrelease/dont-panic/DA_Report_Smartphone_Encryption_
Public_Safety_11182015.pdf [https://perma.cc/4BQN-7WLX].
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the right against self-incrimination,85 courts should endeavor to fashion a
new standard that places at its core the principle of privacy. Doing so will
give greater protection to the private lives of citizens, which are increas-
ingly contained in their smartphones.
III. CURRENT STATE OF THE RIGHT AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION
The Fifth Amendment guarantees the privilege to be free from self-
incrimination, stating that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself.”86 This privilege is under-
stood to most strongly reflect the American judicial system’s preference
for an “accusatorial, not inquisitorial” criminal procedure.87 However,
notwithstanding its significance to the criminal justice system, judges and
commentators have struggled to identify the privilege’s central policy
objectives or how far it should extend.88 Justice Harlan notably remarked:
“The Constitution contains no formulae with which we can calculate the
areas . . . to which the privilege should extend, and the Court has there-
fore been obliged to fashion for itself standards for the application of the
privilege.”89 Generally, the Supreme Court has interpreted the self-in-
crimination clause as prohibiting the government from compelling an in-
dividual to testify against himself or from compelling an individual to
offer testimonial evidence that would be self-incriminatory.90 Thus, “for
the privilege to apply, the communication the defendant is attempting to
protect must be compelled, testimonial, and incriminating in nature.”91 If
these three requirements are not met, then the privilege is not implicated.
As is the case for the Constitution generally, the Fifth Amendment’s lan-
guage is subject to broad interpretation and has invited courts to expand
its meaning far beyond its literal terms.92 Particularly contentious has
85. See infra Section III.A.
86. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
87. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964).
88. Robert B. McKay, Self-Incrimination and the New Privacy, 1967 SUP. CT. REV.
193, 193–94 (1967).
89. Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 522 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see Murphy v.
Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 56 n.5 (1964) (quoting Harry Kalven, Jr.,
Invoking the Fifth Amendment—Some Legal and Impractical Considerations, 9 BULL.
ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 181, 182 (1953)).
90. See United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 43 (2000); Fisher v. United States, 425
U.S. 391, 409 (1976).
91. Nicholas Soares, Note, The Right to Remain Encrypted: The Self-Incrimination
Doctrine in the Digital Age, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 2001, 2004 (2012) (citing Fisher v.
United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976) (“stating that the >Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination applies only when the accused is compelled to make a testimo-
nial communication that is incriminating”)); see also United States v. Authement, 607 F.2d
1129, 1131 (5th Cir. 1979).
92. Lisa Tarallo, Note, The Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: The
Time Has Come for the United States Supreme Court to End Its Silence on the Rationale
Behind the Contemporary Application of the Privilege, 27 NEW ENG. L. REV. 137, 137
(1992).
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been judicial interpretation of what encompasses “testimonial” activity.93
A. SUPREME COURT AND THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
As early as 1886, the Supreme Court struggled to define what actions
can be properly characterized as testimonial in nature.94 In Boyd v.
United States, the Court found that the privilege against self-incrimination
applied when a court ordered a defendant to turn over documents that
were intended to evince criminal conduct of the defendant.95 The Court
reasoned that the governmental order to produce the incriminating docu-
ments was a way of forcibly extracting testimony out of an individual in
violation of his constitutional right to be free from self-incrimination
under governmental compulsion.96 In the Boyd Court’s view, the “seizure
of a man’s . . . papers” is fundamentally tantamount to “compelling him
to be a witness against himself.”97 Thus, in this instance, the Court re-
garded compelled documents as mere substitutes for the compelled testi-
mony of an individual against himself.
Following Boyd, in Holt v. United States, the Court narrowed the privi-
lege against self-incrimination by attempting to create a distinction be-
tween “physical” evidence and “communicative,” or “testimonial,”
evidence.98 In Holt, a defendant asserted his right against self-incrimina-
tion to suppress evidence that a specific incriminating shirt fit him after
the government had compelled him to try it on.99 Writing for the major-
ity, Justice Holmes rejected the defendant’s attempted use of the privi-
lege calling it “an extravagant extension of the [Fifth] Amendment.”100
Holmes noted that the privilege is only intended to protect communica-
tive evidence, which does not encompass the “body as evidence when it
may be material.”101 Therefore, by drawing this distinction, the Court
seemed to suggest that the right against self-incrimination applied only to
evidence that could be communicated in some form or another and not to
evidence that was merely physical.
In Schmerber v. California, the Supreme Court adopted the same rea-
soning used by Justice Holmes in Holt. The Court held that government
compulsion of an individual to furnish a blood sample, although poten-
tially incriminating, did not fall within the privilege because it is a non-
communicative, non-testimonial act.102 The Schmerber decision not only
93. See id. at 147–52; see also Jody C. Barillare, Comment, As Its Next Witness, the
State Calls . . . the Defendant: Brain Fingerprinting as “Testimonial” Under the Fifth
Amendment, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 971, 982 (2006).
94. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
95. Id. at 633.
96. Id. at 630.
97. Id. at 633.
98. 218 U.S. 245, 252–53 (1910).
99. Id. at 252.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 252–53.
102. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966). The U.S. Attorney’s Office for
the Central District of California heavily relied on this case to argue that the warrant com-
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established the rule that compelled blood samples are not testimonial in
nature, but its reasoning also clarified the physical versus communicative
distinction Justice Holmes established in Holt.103
In explaining its holding, the Schmerber Court noted that although the
government had compelled the defendant to unwillingly participate in the
collection of evidence used to incriminate him by forcing him to furnish a
blood sample,104 providing a blood sample is not testimonial.105 The
Court explained that “the privilege is a bar against compelling ‘communi-
cations’ or ‘testimony,’ but . . . compulsion which makes a suspect or ac-
cused the source of ‘real or physical evidence’ does not violate it.”106 The
defendant’s participation in the extraction of the blood sample was irrele-
vant because the results of the test did not depend on the defendant’s
efforts, but rather on an independent chemical analysis.107
However, the Court qualified that, sometimes, there will be “cases in
which such a distinction [between physical and testimonial evidence] is
not readily drawn.”108 Such a qualification impliedly recognizes that
physical evidence at times may possess communicative attributes. Fur-
thermore, the Court curiously noted that if its understanding of the privi-
lege’s scope fully comported with the principles the privilege helps
protect—including “the inviolability of the human personality”109—then
the Court likely would have concluded that the privilege was in fact vio-
lated in this case.110
A year after Schmerber, the Supreme Court further restricted the
meaning of “testimonial” in United States v. Wade.111 In Wade, the Su-
preme Court considered a situation where the government compelled a
defendant to stand in a lineup and speak words that were uttered by a
bank robber so that bank employees could identify the actual perpetra-
tor.112 The bank employees identified the defendant’s voice as that of the
bank robber in the lineup and at trial as the person who robbed the
bank.113 The defendant’s counsel objected to the courtroom identifica-
tion, claiming that compelling the defendant to stand in the lineup and
utter the words of the bank robber “violated his Fifth Amendment [right]
against self-incrimination.”114 The Court rejected this proposition,115 ob-
serving that standing in the lineup and vocalizing a phrase was “compul-
pelling individuals to press their fingerprints on their smartphones to unlock them did not
violate the right against self-incrimination. See Memorandum, supra note 4, at 3.
103. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 765; see also supra text accompanying note 98.
104. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 761.
105. Id. at 765.
106. Id. at 764.
107. Id. at 765.
108. Id. at 764.
109. Id. at 762 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966)).
110. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 762.
111. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
112. Id. at 220.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 221.
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sion of the accused to exhibit his physical characteristics, not compulsion
to disclose any knowledge he might have.”116 Thus, in the Court’s view,
compelling the accused to speak in this case was not testimonial because
his speech was used “as an identifying physical characteristic, not to
speak his guilt.”117
In 1988, the Supreme Court sought to consolidate the holdings and ra-
tionales of Fifth Amendment self-incrimination cases to develop a clearer
and more precise picture of what constitutes testimonial or communica-
tive evidence covered under the privilege.118 In Doe v. United States, the
issue before the Court was whether the government could compel an in-
dividual to sign a consent form that would authorize financial institutions
to release records of his bank accounts that could reveal evidence of fi-
nancial fraud.119 Upon examining the Court’s precedent on the privilege,
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, concluded that “to be testimo-
nial, an accused’s communication must itself, explicitly or implicitly, re-
late a factual assertion or disclose information. Only then is a person
compelled to be a ‘witness’ against himself.”120 Using this rationale, the
Court held that compelling a defendant to sign a consent form allowing
the release of potentially incriminating financial documents would not
implicate the privilege against self-incrimination because “neither the
form, nor its execution, communicates any factual assertions, implicit121
or explicit, or conveys any information to the [g]overnment.”122
“[T]he [Fifth] Amendment does not protect against the self-disclosure
of all incriminating evidence.”123 The Supreme Court in United States v.
Hubbell124 helped clarify which type of activity could rise to the level of
incriminating testimonial evidence. In Hubbell, the Court held that a de-
fendant’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination could be vio-
lated if the government compelled the defendant to produce documents
that could lead to potentially incriminating evidence.125 Additionally, the
Court added that in producing documents “[i]t was unquestionably neces-
116. Id. at 222. Similar Court rulings and reasoning include United States v. Dionisio,
410 U.S. 1, 7 (1973) (holding that the government may compel a voice recording because it
falls outside of the scope of the privilege since it is being compelled to identify physical
properties of the voice and not to analyze the content of vocalizations); Gilbert v. Califor-
nia, 388 U.S. 263, 266–67 (1967) (holding that the government can compel a suspect to
provide a handwriting sample because a handwriting sample is an identifying physical char-
acteristic that stands outside the protection of the privilege, despite the fact that handwrit-
ing is typically used as a communicative device).
117. Wade, 388 U.S. at 222–23.
118. See Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201 (1988).
119. Id. at 202–03.
120. Id. at 208–10.
121. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410–11 (1976) (stating that the act of
production may rise to the level of testimonial activity because it could communicate im-
plicit statements of fact such as that the produced content exists, is in the control of the
accused, and is authentic).
122. Doe, 487 U.S. at 215.
123. See Soares, supra note 91.
124. 530 U.S. 27 (2000).
125. Id. at 43.
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sary for respondent to make extensive use of ‘the contents of his own
mind’ in identifying the hundreds of documents responsive to the re-
quests in the subpoena.”126 The majority opinion observed that the
mental exertion implicated in assembling documents could constitute a
testimonial act because “[t]he assembly of those documents [is] like tell-
ing an inquisitor the combination to a wall safe, not like being forced to
surrender the key to a strongbox.”127 Therefore, after Hubbell, the Court
seemingly shifted its rationale in self-incrimination cases from the physi-
cal versus testimonial dichotomy to an analysis focused on whether the
suspect used his mental faculties to help the government assemble its
case.
B. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE FOREGONE CONCLUSION DOCTRINE
It is necessary to mention an exception to the Fifth Amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination known as the foregone conclusion doc-
trine, albeit briefly, for the purposes of this Comment.128 The foregone
conclusion doctrine provides that a compelled act of production is not
testimonial whenever the information conveyed is already known by the
government, such that the individual “adds little or nothing to the sum
total of the [g]overnment’s information.”129 For the doctrine to apply, the
government must show with reasonable particularity that when it com-
pelled the individual to produce the information it wanted, it already
knew the evidence sought existed, the evidence was in the possession of
the accused, and the evidence was authentic.130 If the government can
establish this “with reasonable particularity,” then the foregone conclu-
sion doctrine applies, meaning that the information is not covered within
the scope of the privilege and the compelled production of the informa-
tion does not violate the Fifth Amendment guarantee against self-
incrimination.131
C. LOWER COURTS’ INTERPRETATION OF THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION USING SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
Despite a storied jurisprudence on the testimonial component of the
right against self-incrimination,132 the Supreme Court has yet to decide a
self-incrimination case involving encrypted devices. However, several
lower courts have applied Supreme Court precedent in encryption cases
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. An extensive discussion of the foregone conclusion doctrine is not necessary here
because the factual scenario this Comment analyzes—namely, whether compelled produc-
tion of fingerprints onto a smartphone device—does not implicate the doctrine since law
enforcement officers execute the warrants without knowing of any specific incriminating
information on these people’s devices.
129. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 411 (1976).
130. United States v. Greenfield, 831 F.3d 106, 115–16 (2d Cir. 2016) (SUBS
HISTORY).
131. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411; see Greenfield, 831 F.3d at 116.
132. See generally supra Sections III.A. & III.B.
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involving passwords on phones and computers.133 Attention must be
given to these cases to accurately assess whether courts would consider
compulsion of fingerprints to access smartphone devices a violation of the
privilege against self-incrimination.
In In re Grand Jury Subpoena Tecum Dated March 25, 2011, the Elev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals held that compelling a defendant to give
up his computer password so the government could decrypt files on his
hard drive was a violation of the right against self-incrimination.134 The
court determined that requiring an individual to disclose his password to
decrypt his files and make them accessible to the government is a testi-
monial act because the individual reveals “contents of [his] mind” in the
process.135
In 2010, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan in
United States v. Kirschner similarly addressed whether compelling a de-
fendant to produce his computer password implicated the right against
self-incrimination.136 In Kirschner, the government subpoenaed an indi-
vidual, compelling him to provide all passwords associated with his com-
puter or with files on his computer,137 to look for alleged evidence of
child pornography located in the individual’s encrypted computer files.138
The defendant resisted the subpoena on the grounds that such compul-
sion violated his right against self-incrimination.139 The court agreed with
the defendant and held that the subpoena did, in fact, violate the consti-
tutional rights of the defendant140 because producing a computer pass-
word was analogous to producing a wall safe combination that resides in
the mind of an individual.141 In the court’s view, providing a decryption
password was “about producing specific testimony asserting a fact” and,
thus, testimonial evidence that enjoyed protection under the privilege
against self-incrimination.142
State courts also have looked at how self-incrimination jurisprudence
applies to cases involving encrypted devices. The Supreme Judicial Court
of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts analyzed article 12 of its state
constitution—the equivalent of the federal Constitution’s Fifth Amend-
ment—to determine whether compelled production of a computer’s en-
133. See generally In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Mar. 25, 2011,
United States v. John Doe, 670 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2012) (Nos. 11-12268, 11-15421);
United States v. Kirschner, 823 F. Supp. 2d 665 (E.D. Mich. 2010); Commonwealth v. Gelf-
gatt, 468 Mass. 512 (2014); Commonwealth v. Baust, 89 Va. Cir. 267 (2014).
134. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Mar. 25, 2011, 670 F.3d at
1352–53.
135. Id. at 1341, 1346.
136. Kirschner, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 668.
137. Id. at 666.
138. Id. at 667.
139. Id. at 668.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 668–69 (stating that United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 43 (2000) resolved
that something analogous to a wall safe that only resides in an individual’s mind is
testimonial.)
142. Kirschner, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 669.
2017] When Fingerprints Are Key 551
cryption key violated the right against self-incrimination.143 The self-
incrimination analysis used by the Massachusetts courts, just like federal
precedent, precludes protection under the privilege if the information
sought is physical or non-testimonial evidence.144 Under this court’s view,
a testimonial action is any action that reflects the “knowledge, under-
standing, and thoughts” of the accused.145
Applying this rationale, the court observed that, “at first blush,” the
defendant’s governmentally-compelled act of decrypting his computer
would appear testimonial because it would acknowledge the defendant’s
“ownership and control [over] the computer[ ]” and “be a communication
of his knowledge about particular facts that would be relevant to the
Commonwealth’s case.”146 However, the court held that the evidence ul-
timately did not amount to testimonial evidence because “the factual
statements that would be conveyed by the defendant’s act of entering an
encryption key . . . [were] ‘foregone conclusions’” given that the govern-
ment knew with reasonable particularity of the existence, control, and
authenticity of the incriminating evidence.147 In her dissent, Justice Lenk
said that such an order should be deemed a violation of an individual’s
right against self-incrimination because it “is the functional equivalent of
requiring him to produce the unencrypted contents of the devices
seized.”148
Pertinent to this Comment’s focus, a Virginia trial court recently heard
a case regarding the right against self-incrimination in the context of
smartphones encrypted using fingerprint authentication.149 The Virginia
court held that, pursuant to the privilege against self-incrimination, a sus-
pect “cannot be compelled [by the police] to produce his passcode to ac-
cess his smartphone but he can be compelled to produce his fingerprint to
do the same.”150 The Virginia court determined that a fingerprint, unlike
a passcode, is not an artifact of the defendant’s mind that is kept entirely
within the confines of his mind.151 In the court’s analysis, revealing a
password invariably requires a person to divulge his mental processes
and, thus, is protected testimonial evidence under the Fifth Amend-
ment.152 Conversely, “[t]he fingerprint like a key . . . does not require the
witness to divulge anything through his mental processes” and, thus, can-
not be characterized as testimonial evidence subject to the privilege
against self-incrimination.153 For the Virginia trial court, compelling an
individual to produce a fingerprint to unlock a smartphone is analogous
143. Commonwealth v. Gelfgatt, 468 Mass. 512, 513–14 (2014).
144. Id. at 525.
145. Id. at 525–26.
146. Id. at 522.
147. Id. at 523–24.
148. Id. at 527–28 (Lenk J., dissenting).
149. Commonwealth v. Baust, 89 Va. Cir. 267 (2014).
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to ordering a DNA sample or a key—it is constitutionally permissible
because it involves compulsion of physical evidence and not testimonial
evidence.154
More recently, in State v. Diamond, a Minnesota state appellate court
faced this issue as a matter of first impression.155 Like the Virginia court
in Baust, the Minnesota court concluded that forcing a person to produce
his fingerprint or thumbprint to unlock his smartphone does not implicate
his right against self-incrimination.156 In this fact pattern, an individual
suspected of burglary and theft was compelled by court order, based on
probable cause, to press his fingerprint or thumbprint on his smartphone
so the police could search it.157 After the individual initially refused to
comply, asserting his privilege against self-incrimination, threat of civil
contempt eventually led him to comply, and the search revealed incrimi-
nating evidence against him.158 The individual submitted a motion to sup-
press the evidence found on his cellphone, which the district court
denied.159
On appeal, the court held that the individual’s Fifth Amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination was not violated because compelled pro-
duction of a fingerprint is not testimonial.160 In the court’s view, the
action was not testimonial because, unlike decrypting a hard drive or pro-
ducing the combination to a safe, the individual “was not required to dis-
close any knowledge he might have or to speak his guilt.”161 For it to be
protected testimonial activity, the activity must involve some “level of
knowledge and mental capacity” and cannot be the compelled production
of mere physical characteristics or attributes.162 Additionally, the court
asserted that the non-testimonial nature of pressing a fingerprint on a
smartphone to unlock it is not overcome by the fact that such an action
necessarily shows exclusive control over the smartphone and the informa-
tion contained inside it.
154. Id.
155. 890 N.W.2d 143, 149 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017) (SUBS HISTORY).
156. Id. at 151.
157. Id. at 145–46.
158. Id. at 146, 150.
159. Id. at 146.
160. Id. at 151.
161. Diamond, 890 N.W.2d at 150.
162. Id. at 151.
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IV. ANALYZING WHETHER COMPELLED FINGERPRINT
PRODUCTION TO UNLOCK A SMARTPHONE
DEVICE VIOLATES THE RIGHT AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION
A. UNDER CURRENT JURISPRUDENCE, COMPELLED FINGERPRINT
PRODUCTION TO UNLOCK A SMARTPHONE DOES NOT
VIOLATE THE RIGHT AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION
Under current Supreme Court precedent, courts are likely to employ
the same rationale as the lower courts in the Virginia and Minnesota
cases163 in determining if compelling fingerprints to unlock a phone vio-
lates a citizen’s right against self-incrimination. Like the decisions of the
lower courts discussed supra,164 courts are likely to view an individual’s
production of a fingerprint to unlock a smartphone merely as a source of
“real or physical evidence”165 and not testimonial in nature because it
does not communicate “contents of [the] mind.”166 Therefore, courts
likely will reach the conclusion that compelled production of a fingerprint
to unlock a phone is a non-testimonial act and, thus, not protected under
the right against self-incrimination.
The operative legal framework dictates that fingerprints, regardless of
their actual function, generally will be viewed as real or physical evi-
dence, meaning that the government has the right to freely compel their
production without violating the right against self-incrimination.167 As
the lower courts correctly point out, a password is qualitatively different
than tangible, bodily evidence.168 A password’s exact sequence, typically
in some form of alpha-numerical sequence, resides in the depths of our
minds. Thus, it follows that when the government compels an individual
to produce his password in an investigation, the individual is being asked
to make use of his mental faculties169 and “to disclose any knowledge he
might have,”170 namely the characters and order of those characters that
make up his password. Communicating a password to a law enforcement
officer “explicitly . . . relate[s] a factual assertion”171 that is fundamentally
a testimonial, communicative act.172
A fingerprint, on the other hand, has none of these qualities. A finger-
print is tangible, bodily evidence that is not located within an individual’s
163. See generally id.; Commonwealth v. Baust, 89 Va. Cir. 267 (2014).
164. See supra Section III.C.
165. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966).
166. United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 43 (2000).
167. See Soares, supra note 91, at 2004–05.
168. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Mar. 25, 2011, 670 F.3d 1335,
1341, 1346 (11th Cir. 2012); United States v. Kirschner, 823 F. Supp. 2d 665, 668–69 (E.D.
Mich. 2010); Commonwealth v. Gelfgatt, 468 Mass. 512, 525–26 (2014); Baust, 89 Va. Cir.
at 271.
169. See Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 43.
170. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 222 (1967).
171. See Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210 (1988).
172. See Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252–53 (1910).
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mind.173 It is an identifying physical characteristic,174 much like some-
one’s voice175 or handwriting.176 Hence, providing a fingerprint to unlock
a smartphone is more akin to providing a “key to a strongbox” than “the
combination to a wall safe” because it involves surrendering something
with a physical substance, as opposed to a mental configuration, to access
possibly incriminating information.177 Under the current state of the law,
when the government compels an individual to press his fingerprint on his
phone to unlock it, the government compels “the accused to exhibit his
physical characteristics, not . . . to disclose any knowledge he might
have.”178
In the factual scenario at hand,179 although the government would be
compelling an individual to unwillingly participate in the collection of evi-
dence potentially used to incriminate him by forcing him to press his fin-
gerprint on his smartphone to unlock it,180 the very act itself of producing
a fingerprint, like a blood sample, likely would be considered non-testi-
monial.181 Therefore, because governmentally-compelled production of a
fingerprint is non-testimonial, the Central District of California correctly
concluded in its memo that the right against self-incrimination likely is
not implicated.182 As TIME magazine astutely observed, despite cell
phone manufacturers proudly touting that features like fingerprint au-
thentication enhance the security of devices,183 the reality is that “data
protected only by an old-school passcode is afforded stronger legal pro-
tection under the Fifth Amendment.”184
B. A CALL TO RETURN THE PRINCIPLE OF PRIVACY TO SELF-
INCRIMINATION JURISPRUDENCE
It has been previously acknowledged that “[t]echnology has outgrown
the Supreme Court’s Fifth Amendment jurisprudence.”185 Although cur-
rent self-incrimination precedent leads to the conclusion that compelled
fingerprint production to unlock a phone does not implicate the right
against self-incrimination,186 the outcome should be different. In deciding
what is protected testimonial evidence, it is imperative for courts to shift
173. See Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 43.
174. See Wade, 388 U.S. at 222–23.
175. See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 7 (1973).
176. See Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266–67 (1967).
177. See Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 43.
178. See Wade, 388 U.S. at 222 (emphasis added).
179. See supra, Section I.A.
180. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966).
181. See id. at 765.
182. See Memorandum, supra note 4, at 3.
183. See Touch ID, supra note 21.
184. Jack Linshi, Why the Constitution Can Protect Passwords but Not Fingerprint
Scans, TIME (Nov. 6, 2014), http://time.com/3558936/fingerprint-password-fifth-amend
ment/ [https://perma.cc/SFR7-Q649].
185. Vivek Mohan & John Villasenor, Decrypting the Fifth Amendment: The Limits of
Self-Incrimination in the Digital Era, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY 11, 11
(2012).
186. See generally supra Section IV.A.
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away from the physical versus communicative dichotomy187 if the privi-
lege against self-incrimination is to be protected from being “eviscerated
by emerging technologies.”188 The need to shift away from this long-used
distinction is borne out of the rapidly changing technological landscape in
which we live. For example, Susan Brenner, a law professor at the Uni-
versity of Dayton, views the current approach to testimonial evidence as
outdated for our current environment.189 “It isn’t about fingerprints and
the biometric readers,” Brenner stated, but rather about “the contents of
[a] phone, much of which will be about [people], and . . . that could be
incriminating.”190
Brenner perceptively notes that in our ever-changing technological
world—where fingerprints, retinas, and other sources of biometric data
are proliferating encryption sources in mobile devices191— courts should
cautiously exercise their judicial capacities so as to not violate the intrinsi-
cally valuable right to privacy enshrined in the Constitution by giving the
government unimpeded access to the private contents in people’s
smartphones.192 In relying on the physical versus communicative distinc-
tion, courts have imperiled a principle of “great probative force” that has
served as a compelling justification for the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation: the principle of individual privacy.193
Even though compelling someone to provide a fingerprint to unlock a
phone is functionally equivalent to forcing that same person to provide an
alpha-numerical password for that same phone, courts have chosen to
treat these two methods of encryption differently because of the judici-
ary’s steadfast reliance on the outdated distinction between physical and
communicative evidence.194 There is no meaningful difference between
fingerprints and passwords in the context of encrypted smartphones and
the right against self-incrimination; both methods of encryption function
to make private information inaccessible to third parties. Therefore, in
deciding the scope of the privilege, it is improper to treat compelled fin-
gerprint production to unlock a smartphone the same as compelled physi-
cal or real evidence because mere physical evidence, like a blood sample,
“is readily separable from what we think important about us, whereas
187. See Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252–53 (1910).
188. Mohan & Villasenor, supra note 186, at 11.
189. Ben Lovejoy, FBI Granted Federal Court Warrant Forcing Suspect to Unlock
iPhone Using Touch ID, 9TO5MAC (May 2, 2016, 4:06 AM), https://9to5mac.com/2016/05/
02/federal-court-touch-id-fingerprint/ [https://perma.cc/MR6F-R3C4].
190. Id.
191. See Biometrics Report, supra note 78; Whitney, supra note 79; see also Michael
Corkery, Goodbye, Password. Banks Opt to Scan Fingers and Faces Instead, N.Y. TIMES
(June 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/22/business/dealbook/goodbye-pass
word-banks-opt-to-scan-fingers-and-faces-instead.html [https://perma.cc/C7HU-TTS3]
(noting that banks are moving toward facial and fingerprint scans for enhanced security).
192. See supra Section III.A.
193. McKay, supra note 88, at 213–14; see Note, Formalism, Legal Realism, and Consti-
tutionally Protected Privacy Under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 90 HARV. L. REV.
945, 951 (1977).
194. See, e.g., Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252–53 (1910).
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[the contents of our phones like our] thoughts are not.”195
Fingerprint authentication “acts like a password. [It is] a simple pass-
word, but [it is] still a password.”196 At a rudimentary level, compelling
an individual to decrypt his smartphone, whether by compelling produc-
tion of a fingerprint or a password, gives the government unbounded ac-
cess to information, much of which is private in nature and potentially
incriminating. Commenting on the legality of compulsion of fingerprints
to unlock a smartphone, criminal defense attorney Hayes Hunt remarked
that “once we put a password on something or on ourselves, we have a
certain privacy interest.”197 For the courts to suggest that fingerprints are
dissimilar to passwords amounts to nothing more than a “clever end-run”
around a citizen’s right to be free from incriminating himself with his own
private information.198
Thus, courts should actively look to reincorporate the principle of pri-
vacy to the nucleus of self-incrimination analysis when deciding if an ac-
tion is testimonial or not. Doing so will ensure that the courts are
adapting to the unexpected changes that accompany technological devel-
opment. More importantly, it would protect individuals from arbitrary le-
gal distinctions that beget different outcomes in functionally similar
situations, such as allowing the government to access private information
on a person’s smartphone if they use fingerprint authentication but not if
they use an alpha-numerical password. To determine how the principle of
privacy should be reincorporated, it is necessary to review the role the
principle has played in the past with respect to this right.
1. Supreme Court’s Views on the Principle of Privacy and the Right
Against Self-Incrimination
Justice Felix Frankfurter wisely remarked that in interpreting the Fifth
Amendment “a page of history is worth a volume of logic.”199 Retrospec-
tively looking at how the Supreme Court has viewed rights under the
Fifth Amendment, it is discernable that the principle of privacy once
served as a fundamental justification for the right against self-incrimina-
tion.200 In fact, scholars have recognized that “the claim that compelled
self-incrimination is an improper and impermissible invasion of a person’s
right to privacy” is “[o]ne of the most popular justifications for the privi-
lege against self-incrimination.”201 The Supreme Court has, on various
195. Dov Fox, Article, The Right to Silence as Protecting Mental Control, 42 AKRON L.
REV. 763, 796 (2009).
196. Orin Kerr, The Fifth Amendment and Touch ID, WASH. POST (Oct. 21, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/10/21/the-fifth-amend
ment-and-touch-id/?tid=a_inl&utm_term=.4654e54a3b27 [https://perma.cc/ZU9K-RCEC].
197. Linshi, supra note 185.
198. See Turner, supra note 23.
199. Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 438 (1956) (quoting N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eis-
ner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921)).
200. David Dolinko, Is There A Rationale for the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination?,
33 UCLA L. REV. 1063, 1090, 1107 (1986).
201. Tarallo, supra note 92, at 168–69 (citing Dolinko, supra note 201, at 1107).
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occasions, endorsed this justification for the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation.202 For example, as early as 1928, Justice Brandeis, writing in dis-
sent, noted that the Fifth Amendment is one of the primary constitutional
pillars of the right to privacy because it protects citizens from governmen-
tal “invasion[ ] . . . of the sanctities of a man’s home and the privacies of
life.”203
Furthermore, in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New York Har-
bor, Justice Goldberg expressed that privacy is one of the “fundamental
values and most noble aspirations” the country’s founders sought to pro-
tect in the Fifth Amendment.204 In Justice Goldberg’s view, freedom
from self-incrimination is not only a valuable shelter for the guilty against
abusive government techniques, but also a valuable shield for the inno-
cent from having the government violate their “human personality” by
disrespecting their “private enclave” and “private life.”205
Moreover, in his majority opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut, Justice
Douglas noted that “[v]arious guarantees create zones of privacy. . . . The
Fifth Amendment in its [s]elf-[i]ncrimination [c]lause enables the citizen
to create a zone of privacy which government may not force him to sur-
render to his detriment.”206 Justice Goldberg’s and Justice Douglas’s ar-
ticulations of the inviolable principle of privacy, thus, reflect the profound
Western tradition for respecting the intrinsic value of personal privacy
that “inheres” by virtue of being human.207 Thus, the right against self-
incrimination derives justification from the notion that an individual’s pri-
vacy is violated when others obtain his sensitive personal information
contrary to his wishes.208
Evidently, the privilege against self-incrimination has historically func-
tioned in large part “to protect a ‘natural individual from compulsory in-
crimination through his own testimony or personal records.’”209
Compelling a suspect to involuntarily give the government access to a
device containing his greatest intimacies undermines the value the Fifth
Amendment and other constitutional provisions place on individual pri-
vacy. After all, smartphone devices represent “the microcosm of an indi-
vidual”210 on account of how society uses them. Hence, courts should shy
away from using feeble distinctions between communicative and physical
evidence in determining which activities are testimonial and which are
202. Id. at 168.
203. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 630 (1886)).
204. 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
205. Id. (quoting United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 581–82 (2d Cir. 1956)
(Frank, J., dissenting), rev’d, 353 U.S. 391 (1957)).
206. 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (emphasis added).
207. Formalism, Legal Realism, and Constitutionally Protected Privacy Under the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments, supra note 194, at 986.
208. See Dolinko, supra note 201, at 1108.
209. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 470–71 (1976) (quoting Bellis v. United
States, 417 U.S. 85, 89 –90 (1974)).
210. Whitten, supra note 58, at 1–2.
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not to avoid coercing individuals from revealing the private contents
found in their smartphones.211 Instead, courts should limit the govern-
ment’s access to what is, together with the human mind, “the ‘most pri-
vate preserve of our ordinary lives’”: our smartphone devices.212
Although the Fifth Amendment does not, by its language, guarantee a
general right of privacy, the Supreme Court has opined that the individ-
ual right “to a private enclave” and “a private life” is central to the spirit
of the right against self-incrimination.213 When the legal system allows
the government to indiscriminately access the smartphones of its citizens
by virtue of an outdated distinction, in effect it permits the government to
unimpededly look through what has been properly described “as [an] ex-
tension[ ] of ourselves.”214 This amounts to governmental intrusion upon
the “most private preserve of our ordinary lives, the place inside every-
one’s head where secrets reside.”215
2. Philosophical Considerations
Renowned legal scholar David Dolinko has argued against a privacy-
based rationale to support the right against self-incrimination.216 Dolinko
argues that if the purpose of the privilege is to protect individual privacy,
“why should it rule out only one special type of infringement of privacy,”
namely government-compelled self-incrimination?217 In his view, an indi-
vidual’s privacy is always infringed, some way or another, whenever po-
tentially incriminating information about a person is revealed against his
wishes.218 Dolinko sees no qualitative difference between the govern-
ment compelling an individual to disclose information about himself and
the government acquiring that same incriminating evidence by indepen-
dent means.219 Therefore, Dolinko posits that because individual privacy
is always violated when a person’s information is obtained contrary to his
or her wishes—regardless of how it is obtained—then the principle of
privacy cannot serve as a legitimate justification for the right against self-
incrimination.220
However, Dolinko fails to recognize that these situations are signifi-
cantly and qualitatively different from a privacy standpoint, particularly
in the context of smartphones. Notably, when the government compels an
211. See Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252–53 (1910).
212. Barillare, supra note 93, at 997 (quoting Robin Marantz Henig, Looking for the
Lie, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2006, § 6 (Magazine), at 47, 50 [DISCUSSING the quote and its
original reference])
213. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55. (quoting United
States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 581 –82 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., dissenting), rev’d, 353
U.S. 391 (1957)).
214. See Lynch, supra note 45.
215. Barillare, supra note 93, at 997 (quoting Robin Marantz Henig, Looking for the
Lie, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2006, § 6 (Magazine), at 48).
216. See Dolinko, supra note 201.
217. Id. at 1109.
218. See id. at 1109–15.
219. See id.
220. See id. at 1136–37.
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individual to reveal information about himself instead of obtaining that
same information through secondary or other objective sources, the indi-
vidual risks disclosing additional information that he sought to keep pri-
vate and unbeknownst to the world. Each person keeps private certain
information in the precipices of his mind—or nowadays his mobile de-
vice—that is intended to be accessible only by himself.
When the government compels an individual to reveal the contents of
his mind, or in this case, the contents of his smartphone by providing a
fingerprint, the individual risks disclosing private information that he in-
tends to keep away from the rest of the world. However, if the govern-
ment accesses the contents of a person’s cellphone by means other than
compulsion, then that information would not be considered private per
se, as there would be a public or secondary means of accessing it. This
necessarily means that the individual, either explicitly or implicitly, made
that information public at some prior point in time, inherently making it
lose any private qualities it had.  Therefore, what Dolinko overlooks is
the value of an individual’s capacity to “modulate the amount” and char-
acter of information that he makes “known to others.”221 After all, “pri-
vacy . . . is the control we have over information about ourselves.”222
When the government compels an individual to give it unrestricted access
to his smartphone, it strips that individual of what should be his ability to
have complete control over the information he has decided to keep
private.223
Considering the importance of this principle of privacy, the govern-
ment should avoid forcing individuals to surrender control of the modula-
tion capacity they have over their own personal information. Instead, the
government should preserve this capacity by fashioning new standards in
the self-incrimination context that are sensitive to the private nature of
personal devices like smartphones. A first step would be for courts to
reevaluate the value behind the physical versus testimonial dichotomy
and analyze its consequences when applied to smartphones and other
types of technological devices. Second, courts must reincorporate the
principle of privacy to their self-incrimination analyses to avoid infringing
on citizens’ rightful control over the private information they wish to
keep secret within their devices. Courts can accomplish this by reinvigo-
rating the principle of privacy as a basic justification for the right against
self-incrimination, and consequently, preventing the government from
compelling individuals to give it unrestricted access to their most personal
information against their will.
221. Robert S. Gerstein, Privacy and Self-Incrimination, 80 ETHICS 87, 89 (1970) (cit-
ing Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L. J. 475, 478–85 (1968)).
222. Id. (quoting Fried, supra note 223, at 482).
223. Id. at 90.
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C. ADDITIONAL ISSUES TO BE EXPLORED—FOURTH AMENDMENT
PARTICULARITY
The issuance of these warrants also raises serious Fourth Amendment
questions.224 Interestingly, one glaring omission from the government’s
memorandum is any discussion on whether the warrant met the Fourth
Amendment’s particularity requirement.225 The Supreme Court has made
clear that, generally, the government must obtain a warrant before
searching an individual’s cell phone for information.226 However, the
Fourth Amendment also mandates that warrants be particular in describ-
ing the places and persons to be searched and seized.227 The framers im-
posed the particularity requirement to avoid the issuance of general
warrants that sanction searches which encroach on an individual’s pri-
vacy.228 Justice Brennan noted that the general warrant is “often re-
garded as the single immediate cause of the American Revolution.”229
Legal experts have raised serious concerns over the particularity of the
warrant issued in the Los Angeles case,230 which gives law enforcement
officers broad authority to search “any person who is located at the SUB-
JECT PREMISES during the execution of the search and who is reasona-
bly believed by law enforcement to be a user of a fingerprint sensor-
enabled device.”231  Jennifer Lynch, a senior staff attorney at the Elec-
tronic Frontier Foundation, cited her concerns about the government’s
warrant being “so broad in scope” and for relying on “outdated cases” to
give it access to a “vast amount of data that’s on [smartphones].”232
Phones contain the private lives of individuals, including their personal
conversations, list of friends and family members, and intimate pictures
of themselves and others. If courts provide law enforcement unimpeded
access to these devices based purely on speculation and the hope of find-
ing something of incriminating value with no regard for specifics, it per-
mits an invasive and unjustified intrusion into the private life of an
individual contained in that pocket-sized device. Lynch worries that “[i]f
this kind of thing became law then there would be nothing to prevent . . .
a search of every phone at a certain location.”233
Several solutions to remedy these intrusive searches into mobile de-
vices have been proposed. A good first step was for the Supreme Court in
224. See Kerr, supra note 2.
225. See Memorandum, supra note 4, at 5–7.
226. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014).
227. See U.S. CONST., amend. 4 (“[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.” (emphasis added)); see Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91
(1979).
228. Collins T. Fitzpatrick, Protecting the Fourth Amendment So We Do Not Sacrifice
Freedom for Security, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2015).
229. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 454 (1963).
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231. Memorandum, supra note 4, at 1–2 (emphasis added).
232. See Fox-Brewster, supra note 3.
233. Id.
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Riley to unequivocally demand that law enforcement officials obtain war-
rants before rummaging through the contents of an individual’s cell
phone.234 However, a further step in the right direction would require
legislators to enact laws that mandate that warrants be highly specific,
describing in detail the information expected to be found in a phone, as
opposed to merely claiming that the phone may contain evidence of a
crime.235 In any event, ample room for discussion remains on this particu-
lar topic, which legal scholars should explore in greater depth.
V. CONCLUSION
We have entered a new world, but as the Supreme Court recognized in
Riley,236 our old values should still apply and be invoked to limit the gov-
ernment’s ability to dig through the intimate details of our private lives,
which day by day are increasingly found in our personal mobile devices.
As our adoption of evolving personal digital technologies continues,
courts and legislators at both the federal and state levels must take corre-
sponding steps forward into the digital age to ensure our fundamental
rights and guaranteed freedoms are neither curtailed nor eroded.
In light of the contemporary societal departure from passwords to bio-
metric data as a form of decryption,237 it is imperative that courts extend
the standard they have set for passwords as testimonial activity to encom-
pass biometric tools that function the same as passwords. Just as sensibili-
ties toward the principle of privacy have led the Court in the past “to
block legislative attempts to control intimate private conduct”—abortion,
right to martial privacy, private possession of obscene material—govern-
mental intrusion into the individual’s private life should be prohibited
under the Fifth Amendment “rather than tolerated as a necessary inci-
dent of criminal law enforcement.”238 Merely believing that someone
may be involved in criminal conduct should not outweigh the interests of
privacy the Constitution holds dear.239
It is inevitable that “[t]he right against self-incrimination has bedeviled
the Court with hard value choices.”240 The right against self-incrimination
will continue to bedevil our courts in this digital era until they make a
deliberate value choice to adapt their understanding of this right to com-
port with new technological advances in a way that is faithful to the guar-
antees of privacy the framers sought to protect in the Constitution.
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